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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-1983 
 ___________ 
 
MARLENE RYDER, 
Ethel-Mae Williams for the Witnessing of the Parse-Syntax-Grammer  
of the Vasalees Fraud-Documents 
 
v.                                                                      
 
*TERRENCE J. MCCABE, ESQ.;  
MCCABE, WEISBERG AND CONWAY, P.C.;  
MARC S. WEISBERG, ESQ.;  
*EDWARD D. CONWAY, ESQ.;  
MARGARET GAIRO, ESQ.;  
EVERHOME MORTGAGE COMPANY 
 
MARLENE RYDER, 
                          Appellant 
 
                                                            *(Amended pursuant to Clerk's Order dated 5/1/12) 
____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 12-cv-00179) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted on Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss the Appeal or for Summary Affirmance 
August 2, 2012 
 
 Before:  SCIRICA, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit 
 
Judges 
 (Opinion filed: August 20, 2012) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 
 Marlene Ryder appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss her 
complaint.  Before us primarily is Appellees’ (Defendants below) motion to dismiss the 
appeal, also construed as a motion for summary affirmance.1  Because the appeal is 
properly before us, we decline to dismiss the appeal.  However, for the reasons given in 
the Appellees’ motion, we find that the appeal presents no substantial question.  We will 
therefore summarily affirm the District Court’s order, pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 
and I.O.P. 10.6.2
 Marlene Ryder filed an incomprehensible, seven-page complaint in the District 
Court.  It appears that the subject matter of the complaint may be related to a mortgage 
foreclosure action that was filed in the state court.  The Defendants filed motions to 
dismiss on three grounds:  (1) the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted; (2) the complaint was barred by the 
 
Rooker-Feldman
                                                 
1 We address the remaining pending motions in footnote 4, infra. 
 doctrine; and (3) the 
District Court lacked jurisdiction at the time the complaint was filed because the Federal 
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania had exclusive jurisdiction over 
 
2 We may summarily affirm an order appealed from where it appears that no substantial 
question is presented.  I.O.P. 10.6.  “Before taking summary action, the court will afford 
the parties an opportunity to submit argument in support of or in opposition to such 
disposition if briefs on the merits have not already been filed.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
Ryder has already filed her informal brief, and it does not address the District Court’s 
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Ryder’s property.   Ryder did not file an answer to the Motions to Dismiss.  The District 
Court granted the Defendants’ motions, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.  
Ryder filed a timely notice of appeal.3
 We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a District 
Court’s order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is plenary.  
 
Dique v. 
N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2010).  To survive a motion to dismiss, a 
plaintiff must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  The complaint must contain “factual content that 
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant[s are] liable for the 
misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly
 The District Court properly dismissed the complaint.  
, 550 
U.S. at 556 (2007)).   
Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. 
Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc.
                                                                                                                                                             
reasons for dismissing her complaint.  Furthermore, Appellees’ motion put her on notice 
of the reasons that her appeal was without merit, and Ryder has responded to that motion. 
, 482 F.3d 247, 252-53 (3d Cir. 2007) (district court may 
enter final order dismissing complaint that fails to state a claim for relief where plaintiff 
has not requested leave to amend).  As noted previously, the complaint is 
incomprehensible.   The first page of the complaint contains the heading, “For the Claim 
3 Ryder has attached to her notice of appeal over 180 pages of documents.  As these 
documents are not part of the District Court record, we do not consider them.  In re 
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.’s Application for Access to Sealed Transcripts, 913 F.2d 89, 96 
(3d Cir. 1990). 
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of the Violation of the False-Claims-Act of the evidence CIVIL COMPLAINT FOR 
FORECLOSURE-Void-Now-Time For the Plaintiff is with the Demanding of the trial by 
the Jury.”  Ryder does not explain how the False Claims Act applies or how it was 
violated.  Indeed, it is difficult to understand what, if any, claims Ryder intends to raise.  
Similarly, the syntax and grammar of the complaint make it difficult to understand 
whether Ryder is asserting any factual matter.  Because the District Court properly 
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, we need not reach the other 
arguments set forth in Appellees’ motion to dismiss. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that no substantial question is presented by 
this appeal.  See I.O.P. 10.6.  Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 
judgment.4
                                                 
4 Ryder’s “Motion for Emergency Injunction” is dismissed.  “[U]nless an appeal be taken 
from the refusal or neglect of a lower tribunal to grant an injunction, our authority to 
grant injunctive relief must proceed from the so-called ‘All Writs’ Section of the Judicial 
Code, Section 262, 28 U.S.C.A. § 377, and may be exercised by us only as auxiliary to 
and strictly in aid of our appellate jurisdiction.”  In re Philadelphia & Reading Coal & 
Iron Co., 103 F.2d 901, 903 (3d Cir. 1939); Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 
21, 25 (1943) (authority of court of appeals to issue writs is restricted by statute to those 
cases in which writ is in aid of appellate jurisdiction).  Because we are denying Ryder’s 
appeal, granting the motion for injunctive relief would not aid our jurisdiction.  Ryder’s 
other outstanding motions are also denied.  See Sewak v. I.N.S., 900 F.2d 667, 673 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (“As an appellate court we do not take testimony, hear evidence or determine 
disputed facts in the first instance.  Instead, we rely upon a record developed in those fora 
that do take evidence and find facts.”). 
   
 
